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COMMENTARY
Causality in cancer research: a journey 
through models in molecular epidemiology 
and their philosophical interpretation
Paolo Vineis1*† , Phyllis Illari2† and Federica Russo3†
Abstract 
In the last decades, Systems Biology (including cancer research) has been driven by technology, statistical modelling 
and bioinformatics. In this paper we try to bring biological and philosophical thinking back. We thus aim at making 
different traditions of thought compatible: (a) causality in epidemiology and in philosophical theorizing—notably, 
the “sufficient-component-cause framework” and the “mark transmission” approach; (b) new acquisitions about 
disease pathogenesis, e.g. the “branched model” in cancer, and the role of biomarkers in this process; (c) the burgeon-
ing of omics research, with a large number of “signals” and of associations that need to be interpreted. In the paper 
we summarize first the current views on carcinogenesis, and then explore the relevance of current philosophical 
interpretations of “cancer causes”. We try to offer a unifying framework to incorporate biomarkers and omic data into 
causal models, referring to a position called “evidential pluralism”. According to this view, causal reasoning is based on 
both “evidence of difference-making” (e.g. associations) and on “evidence of underlying biological mechanisms”. We 
conceptualize the way scientists detect and trace signals in terms of information transmission, which is a generaliza-
tion of the mark transmission theory developed by philosopher Wesley Salmon. Our approach is capable of helping 
us conceptualize how heterogeneous factors such as micro and macro-biological and psycho-social—are causally 
linked. This is important not only to understand cancer etiology, but also to design public health policies that target 
the right causal factors at the macro-level.
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Introduction
What we mean by “cause of a disease” has an obvious 
practical significance, for example for the development of 
drugs and preventive interventions (e.g. vaccination pro-
grammes). We believe that—building on current models 
of cancer causality, and in particular the model offered by 
“molecular epidemiology” [1]—there is the need to rec-
oncile the conceptual interpretation of causality and its 
biological foundation. In this paper we address the mean-
ing of causality in the case of cancer. For many cancers, 
causes are still elusive and there is confusion in the litera-
ture between cause and mechanism. Mechanisms do not 
need to be fully known for hazard identification (which 
can come from epidemiology alone, as was the case of 
smoking and cancer), but knowledge of mechanisms sup-
ports causal reasoning in both hazard identification and 
risk assessment (this is the idea of “evidential pluralism” 
that we also discuss later).
In addition to the practical implications, there are also 
important conceptual (philosophical) aspects in defin-
ing what a cause is, with cancer being an interesting case. 
This is particularly pressing, in the light of the advance-
ments of molecular biology and the use of biomarkers in 
cancer research.
We first summarize the current views on carcinogen-
esis, and then explore the relevance of current philo-
sophical interpretations of causality. We argue that using 
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mechanisms to support causality claims in observational 
epidemiology is not just a matter of adding more fine-
grained associations, but to understand “why” there are 
such associations. Our proposal is that the identification 
of causes of cancer rests on two components: (1) “differ-
ence-making”, and (2) “mechanism”. For example, in the 
recent controversy on the carcinogenicity of red meat [2], 
the epidemiological literature consistently detected an 
increase in risk of colon cancer among red meat eaters 
(difference-making), but further confirmation of a causal 
relationship came from the mechanisms involved, such 
as the formation of carcinogenic nitroso-compounds in 
the intestine of red meat eaters. Risk is just a measure of 
how much individual probability of cancer increases (e.g. 
in the exposed compared to the unexposed), condition-
ally on red meat consumption, but—with notable excep-
tions—a sound conclusion for a causal relationship also 
requires the identification of a plausible mechanism [3].
The molecular basis of cancer: the 
microenvironment underlying 
macroenvironmental causes
We start with the mechanisms that underlie cancer onset, 
i.e. the sequence of molecular events that lead from a 
normal cell to a cancer cell. This is necessary to under-
stand causality, in the framework of cancer as an evo-
lutionary (Darwinian) process. It is important to stress 
that cancer is not a single entity, and therefore pathways 
leading to cancer onset are diversified. There have been 
several important developments in the molecular inter-
pretation of carcinogenesis in recent decades, including 
(a) a wide set of mutagenic events which encompasses 
single base substitutions as well as larger structural 
genetic alterations; (b) an understanding of the crucial 
role of epigenetic changes (defined as functional changes 
in DNA that do not involve a change in the nucleotide 
sequence); (c) an acknowledgement of the importance 
of selection of mutated or epimutated cells; and (d) the 
unifying concept of “branched evolution”, i.e. evolution 
occurs in a branched manner in several tumor types, 
leading to intratumor diversity, with the selective advan-
tage of any genotype depending on the environment [4].
There are several implications for primary prevention 
derived from this definition (represented in Additional 
file 1: Figure S1).
  • Cancers occur in stages that correspond to increasing 
complexity of molecular changes (“intratumor diver-
sity”), with two metastases or two areas in the same 
localized tumour having a different set of mutations.
  • Mutations can be neutral, detrimental or favorable for 
the expansion of a cell clone, depending both on the 
micro-environment, that exerts a selective pressure, 
and the previous history of mutations in the same cell. 
The latter concept is called “historical contingency” 
[5] and corresponds to the influence that previous 
mutations have on the effects of subsequent muta-
tions on protein structure and function, and also on 
the evolution of entire gene regulatory networks [5].
  • In the onset of cancer in individuals, both mutagens 
and “selectogens” play a role, i.e. the individual can-
cer reflects the history of exposures that both induce 
mutations and facilitate the selection of existing 
mutations. Selectogens may include known risk fac-
tors for cancer, such as the metabolic syndrome, that 
are unlikely to have a mutational mechanism as their 
main mode of action, and may predominantly act 
by promoting the selection of cells already carrying 
somatic mutations.
Smith et al. [6] have identified ten “hallmarks of carcin-
ogens”, in the context of the IARC Monographs (Table 1); 
these correspond to the main mechanisms identified so 
far in the pathways to cancer, and at least four of these 
are not based on mutagenesis, e.g. chronic inflammation. 
Table 1 Key characteristics of carcinogens (from Smith et al. 
[6])
1. Is electrophilic or can be metabolically activated
 Parent compound or metabolite with an electrophilic structure (e.g. 
epoxide, quinone, etc.), formation of DNA and protein adducts
2. Is genotoxic
 DNA damage (DNA strand breaks, DNA protein cross-links, unscheduled 
DNA synthesis), intercalation, gene mutations, cytogenetic changes 
(e.g. chromosome aberrations, micronuclei)
3. Alters DNA repair or causes genomic instability
 Alterations of DNA replication or repair (e.g. topoisomerase II, base-
excision or double-strand break repair)
4. Induces epigenetic alterations
 DNA methylation, histone modification, microRNA expression
5. Induces oxidative stress
 Oxygen radicals, oxidative stress, oxidative damage to macromolecules 
(e.g. DNA, lipids)
6. Induces chronic inflammation
 Elevated white blood cells, myeloperoxidase activity, altered cytokine 
and/or chemokine production
7. Is immunosuppressive
 Decreased immunosurveillance, immune system dysfunction
8. Modulates receptor-mediated effects
 Receptor in/activation (e.g. ER, PPAR, AhR) or modulation of exogenous 
ligands (including hormones)
9. Causes immortalization
 Inhibition of senescence, cell transformation
10. Alters cell proliferation, cell death or nutrient supply
 Increased proliferation, decreased apoptosis, changes in growth factors, 
energetics and signaling pathways related to cellular replication or 
cell cycle
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It is likely that in the “branched evolution” paradigm, risk 
factors acting via these mechanisms play the role of selec-
togens. It will also be critically important to understand 
how such non-mutagenic environmental exposures may 
interact with cellular processes that maintain the fidelity 
of DNA (e.g. DNA repair and replication), thus affecting 
the “endogenous” mutations seen in different types of 
human tumours.
Macroenvironmental causes of cancer
How are these concepts, at the level of the micro-envi-
ronment, connected to external exposures in the macro-
environment? Based on epidemiological evidence, we 
know that some 40–50% of cancers would be prevent-
able if current knowledge about risk factors were to be 
translated into preventive interventions [7–9]. There is 
broad consensus on these estimates in the epidemiologi-
cal community, though the concept of “attributable risk” 
is still debated and is methodologically weak (for limita-
tions see [10]).
These preventable cancers are for the most part 
explained by external (or internal—such as endogenous 
nitrosation) exposures that are unlikely to act in isola-
tion: even a “necessary” cause of cancer, human papil-
loma virus (HPV), is itself not sufficient to cause cervical 
cancer in an individual. Though all cervical cancers need 
exposure to HPV, being exposed to HPV needs other 
additional components in the causal constellation that 
led to an individual’s cancer. On a population scale, HPV 
is probably able to explain 100% of cervical cancer cases 
(in principle cervical cancer can be eradicated by vacci-
nation), but each individual case is not entirely explained 
by HPV alone: for example, exposure to the virus hap-
pens in a socio-economic context that is also part of the 
etiology of cancer (including other sexually-transmitted 
infections and behaviours that interact with the virus).
The model of causation that applies to single individu-
als is called the “sufficient-component-cause framework”, 
and it considers sets of actions, events, or states of nature 
that together lead to the outcome under consideration. 
This concept has been popularized by Rothman et  al. 
[11] through the metaphor of “pies”: the constellation 
of exposures that has led to cancer in an individual or 
a group of individuals is represented as a pie where the 
slices are different components and the totality of them 
is causally sufficient. The model gives an account of the 
multiple causes that in their combination lead to a par-
ticular effect. The model usefully captures multi-causality 
and the interaction between component causes (in other 
words their “organization”).
The above concepts allow us to bring together two 
domains that have been separated so far: the “ecology of 
cancer” at a population level (the macro-environment) 
and the mechanisms of carcinogenesis (the micro-envi-
ronment) at the individual level. Additional file 2: Figure 
S2 shows the “ecology” of some common cancers in dif-
ferent countries, though the picture is rapidly changing 
because of globalization [12]: the Figure suggests that in 
each area there are some forms of cancer that prevail due 
to the local predominant exposures. Such exposures are 
likely to be a mixture of mutagens, such as aflatoxin B1, 
and selectogens, such as chronic inflammation caused 
by the hepatitis B virus; these two factors combine to 
increase the risk of e.g. hepatocellular carcinoma in Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa. In other cases a single complex 
mixture, e.g. tobacco smoke, can comprise a combination 
of mutagens and selectogens.
The future challenge will be to monitor this complex 
and changing ecology of cancer (and other non-commu-
nicable diseases), and to relate these changes and inter-
pret their effects with respect to the micro-environmental 
modifications. Equally, starting with the molecular modi-
fications observed at the level of the micro-environment 
can reveal clues as to the ecology of cancer at the macro-
environmental level. An example comes from the recent 
observation that renal cell cancers in some regions in 
Europe have a somatic mutation spectrum that reflects 
exposure to an environmental carcinogen, aristolochic 
acid, previously considered as a risk factor for upper 
urothelial tract cancers [13].
The attempt to connect the external (macro) with the 
internal (micro) environment has been explored within 
“exposome” research [14]. While the macro-environ-
ment represents the “external exposome”, the micro-
environment can be explored as a part of the “internal 
exposome” using the new high-throughput technologies 
of epigenomics, transcriptomics, miRNA, proteomics 
and metabolomics. The connection between the exter-
nal environment and internal biological changes has 
been the goal of molecular epidemiology for decades, as 
expressed for example in Schulte and Perera’s [1] book. 
New technologies can in principle allow us to moni-
tor how the micro-environment can lead to selection of 
mutations and thus identify selectogens as additional tar-
gets for prevention. There are great expectations towards 
these omic technologies for the development and valida-
tion of a suite of new biomarkers to monitor the micro-
environmental changes underlying cancer development.
It is becoming increasingly clear that non-communi-
cable diseases are influenced by events that took place 
throughout an individual’s life-course, in both the macro- 
and micro-environments. The concept of “branched 
evolution” stimulates fresh thought on the relevance 
of timing of exposures in relation to subsequent cancer 
risk. For example, given that certain “driver” mutations 
may only exert their carcinogenic effects in the context 
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of favorable selective conditions at the level of the micro-
environment, one can postulate that past exposures 
may leave genetic or epigenetic alterations that are only 
expressed far later in time, contingent on subsequent 
exposures. The fact that adult diseases such as cardio-
vascular diseases or cancer were influenced by previous 
exposure including in utero, e.g. nutrient deficiency in 
later generations due to the Dutch famine during the 
World War II [15], suggests that the whole lifecourse has 
an impact on adult disease. This poses particular chal-
lenges to the identification of risk factors that may exert a 
type of “hit-and-run” effect.
In sum, the most recent understanding of cancer etiol-
ogy presents us with a complex scenario where disease 
(here, cancer) is the result of a process in which factors 
in the micro- and in the macro-environment interact. 
Such interactions are consistently found in the asso-
ciations identified by studies in molecular epidemiology. 
The challenge for molecular epidemiology is therefore 
to explain how biological mechanisms across the micro- 
and macro-environment contribute to causal reasoning.
A philosophical understanding of cancer etiology
Biomarkers: the link between the macro‑ and the 
micro‑environment
In order to causally link the micro- and macro-environ-
ments, omic technologies provide a key set of instru-
ments in cancer research: these allow us to connect 
exposure and disease by finding the “right” biomarkers. 
Biomarkers are key in causal analysis in cancer research 
and play a major role in our conceptualization of cancer 
causation. This is well expressed in the diagram that con-
nects exposure markers, early effect markers and suscep-
tibility markers in the classical “molecular epidemiology” 
paradigm, as described in Schulte and Perera’s [1] book 
and further elaborated recently [16].
In 1998, the National Institute of Health Biomark-
ers Definitions Working Group defined a biomarker as 
“a characteristic that is objectively measured and evalu-
ated as an indicator of normal biological processes, 
pathogenic processes, or pharmacologic responses to a 
therapeutic intervention.” Biomarkers are largely con-
structed by cross-checking data that are generated by 
some machines (e.g. mass-spectrometry) and subse-
quently analyzed using other machines (computers and 
their algorithms). An important question therefore con-
cerns the kind of ontological status that we should give to 
biomarkers. Strictly speaking, they don’t seem to be just 
‘objects out there’. Schulte and Perera [1] describe bio-
markers in terms of ‘events’ in the continuum from expo-
sure to disease. But even within this continuum, such 
markers may represent a genuine event (e.g. direct expo-
sure to a pollutant), may be correlated with such an event 
(the classical example of yellow fingers in heavy smokers), 
or even be a predictor of the event without being causally 
associated to it (like the association between two X chro-
mosomes and the propensity to wear skirts). The fact that 
biomarkers are hardly corresponding to “causal” molecu-
lar entities does not imply that they cannot be measured. 
In fact, this is what molecular epidemiology routinely 
does. But, as Schulte noticed as early as 1993, there are 
multiple ways of defining and measuring biomarkers, 
which raises the question of their ontological status.
The issue gets even more complex because molecular 
epidemiology is not interested in finding biomarkers per 
se, but in understanding the continuum of disease devel-
opment from early exposures, via finding biomarkers. 
Similarly, in other contributions, the technologies used to 
detect biomarkers (some of which are called omic tech-
nologies) are said to provide the ‘missing link’ between 
exposure and disease or, given the previous discussion, 
between the macro- and the micro-environment [17–19].
This conceptualization of biomarkers search—i.e. as the 
continuum linking exposure and disease—emphasizes 
processes rather than things or objects. This calls for two 
remarks. On the one hand, biomarkers are not entities, 
things to which we can attribute some causal power, in 
the same sense as HPV virus has the power to initiate the 
onset of cervical cancer. Instead, biomarkers are clues, 
indicators, markers to detect in order to reconstruct the 
missing link. On the other hand, and related to the pre-
vious point, we need to say in which sense, if any, these 
continuous links, or processes, between exposure and 
disease are causal. This is all the more important because 
we seek to link heterogeneous levels as the macro- and 
the micro-environment. In sum, our approach aims to 
address two main questions: first, how to understand 
causal production from the macro- to the micro-environ-
ment, and second, why it is important to have a coherent 
conceptualization of such causal links. We discuss these 
two issues in reverse order: spelling out the second ques-
tion will provide further motivation for our approach.
Information transmission and the link between macro‑ 
and micro‑environment
Finding a coherent conceptualization of the link between 
the macro- and the micro-environment is important for 
the following reason. The macro-environment consists 
of biological agents, pollutants and chemicals we are 
exposed to, but also of social interactions and “psycho-
social factors”. The micro-environment, instead, is made 
of biochemical and molecular processes measured at dif-
ferent “omic levels”. How to make the causal link between 
the macro- and the micro-environment plausible, beyond 
a “coarse-grained” difference-making relation between 
the two?
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By and large, traditional epidemiology has done this 
successfully for a long time: establishing robust asso-
ciations between classes of exposures and classes of dis-
eases. But with the advent of molecular epidemiology, 
these associations also relate factors at very different 
levels (the micro and macro environments). This rests 
on a change of the scale of measurement: environmen-
tal exposure has traditionally been assessed by measur-
ing the levels of individual chemicals in, say, air or water. 
Thus newer finer-grained measurements initially try to 
restore some kind of “scale homogeneity”: measure the 
level of a pollutant or of a chemical externally and then 
measure changes at genomic, transcriptomic, proteomic, 
or metabolomic levels internally. Although ‘scale homo-
geneity’ is restored through making all measurements 
chemico-biological measurements, the problem is not 
solved.
In fact, measurements now taking place at the same 
level allow the researcher merely to establish another 
association or series of associations (difference-making 
relations), albeit at a much lower level now. For instance, 
we might establish a robust correlation between the level 
of a certain chemical in the air and the biomarker of early 
clinical changes of a targeted disease (lung cancer). But 
this doesn’t establish a causal link yet. It only estimates 
a more precise measure connecting levels of hazards and 
levels of omic changes. On the one hand, to establish a 
causal link we still need to find the right “intermediate” 
biomarkers, the ones that are linked to exposure and to 
disease. To be sure, this search (finding appropriate bio-
markers) obviously relies upon studying associations, e.g. 
via omics analyses. On the other hand, we need to place 
this reconstructed link into a plausible network of rela-
tions (i.e. the mechanisms of carcinogenesis described in 
the first part of the paper), and this is precisely the kind 
of ‘biological thinking’ mentioned earlier. It is important 
to note that linking, here, cannot be seen by the naked 
eye, and not even using sophisticated experimental set-
ups. Instead, the scientist reconstructs the linking by put-
ting together the pieces of the evidential puzzle, just as 
a crossword puzzle [20]. Biological theory needs to be 
complemented with the results of omic analyses, which 
in turn need sophisticated and complex statistical analy-
ses. It is in this sense that cancer etiology needs a plural-
ity of evidence from which to make causal inferences. All 
this requires considerable empirical evidence and much 
interpretation of the evidence using the appropriate con-
cepts. One such concept is information transmission, as 
we argue later.
A second, more important, reason why the problem is 
not solved is that although homogeneity in the scale of 
measurement is restored by using biological measure-
ments, this makes the results harder to interpret, because 
the interpretation still has to identify causes at the macro 
level, i.e. the level of environmental exposure causing dis-
ease. We need this causal knowledge to design appropri-
ate public health interventions. To sum up: we measure 
everything at the micro-level (level of pollutant, and level 
of metabolite) but ultimately what we want to know is 
how and to what extent environmental pollutants or psy-
cho-social factors cause diseases. The problem molecular 
epidemiology faces is: how can we understand macro-
factors causing micro-factors, or vice versa? What we 
have to establish is a continuous linking, not just (finer-
grained) correlations at a different level of measurement. 
Continuous linking can be conceptualized as information 
transmission, as we explain next.
Productive causality as information transmission
We mentioned earlier that causal claims about exposure 
and cancer involve statements about risks, i.e. difference-
making: whether certain exposures are good predictors of 
disease, at different stages of disease development, or at 
different stages of life, etc. Simultaneously, we also look 
for evidence about how exposure leads to developing dis-
ease. Typically, ‘how’ exposure leads to disease has been 
understood in terms of the mechanisms that produce dis-
ease, mainly with the study of biomarkers. Mechanisms 
provide us with information about how causes produce 
effects. This position is called, in philosophy, evidential 
pluralism, to emphasize the need for multifold (or multi-
layered) evidence in order to establish causal claims [3]. 
A prestigious example of evidential pluralism is the joint 
use of epidemiological evidence (difference-making) 
and mechanistic evidence (productive causality) in the 
Monographs of the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer [21].
The difference-making component of evidential plural-
isms is, in a sense, less controversial than the productive 
component, as even theorizers of agnostic data-driven 
approaches will agree that the search for robust statisti-
cal associations lies at the very heart of data-intensive 
science. What remains controversial is what biomark-
ers are marks of within a mechanistic understanding of 
cancer etiology. This is problematic because, as discussed 
before, we want to establish links between macro- and 
micro-factors. On the one hand, causal relations are not 
reduced to bio-chemical relations and, on the other hand, 
they are not mere (finer-grained) statistical associations 
among macro-variables.
If the causal link connects factors at different scales and 
of different types, then the notion of productive causality 
(i.e. how causes and effects are linked) needs reconceptu-
alization. But the type of linking sought may be different 
depending on the scientific context or the purpose of the 
causal question.
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There are several candidates for characterizing links; 
we mention the two most prominent here. First: Wes-
ley Salmon’s “mark transmission theory” [22–25]. In 
Salmon’s view, the central question is how to distinguish 
between causal processes and non-causal (or pseudo) 
processes. Simply put, causal process transmit marks, 
while pseudo-processes don’t. Think about what hap-
pens when introducing a mark in a process: if the pro-
cess is causal, the mark persists at a later stage. A stock 
example is denting a car, and observing that the dent is 
transmitted along with the movement of the car, while 
its shadow will not further transmit the mark. This 
shows that the moving car is a causal process, while a 
moving shadow is not. However, not every process can 
be marked, and Salmon formulated the approach in 
counterfactual terms: a casual process is one that could 
be marked and that could transmit the mark. Causal 
processes, in this approach, are those transmitting phys-
ics quantities, such as energy or momentum (think of 
billiard balls colliding). However, this approach is tai-
lored to physics and does not provide the conceptual 
tools to understand the macro–micro linking men-
tioned above. Second: the ‘complex-systems’ approach 
[26]. According to this approach, to establish causal 
relations one needs to identify mechanisms, in the sense 
of complex systems that link causes and effects. Such 
approach, however, emphasizes the organization of 
different components of a mechanism, rather than the 
continuum linking exposure to disease. For instance, a 
mechanistic explanation sheds light on the way a gene 
normally is methylated, and how it is hypomethylated 
when exposed to tobacco smoking. We can shed light 
on these mechanistic aspects by identifying the relevant 
molecular entities and activities involved, and their 
organization. But this is not very illuminating about the 
continuous link between exposure and disease, that is 
the process initiated with exposure and that eventually 
leads to disease development, via several intermediate 
stages.
The link is instead better conceptualized using the 
notion of “information transmission”. Note that infor-
mation transmission does not coincide with transfer of 
biological information between macro- and micro-fac-
tors. Instead, information transmission refers to how the 
scientist reconstructs the linking between macro- and 
micro-factors, putting together all the available pieces of 
the evidential puzzle. In other words, information trans-
mission is at the level of epistemology, not of ontology.
In a previous article [27] we suggest that we need to 
explore the prospects of the notion of information that 
comes from the way scientists themselves explain the role 
of biomarkers; in this context, the idea of ‘picking up sig-
nals’ recurs, for instance:
From these two parallel analyses [statistical analy-
ses], we obtained lists of putative markers of (i) the 
disease outcome, and (ii) exposure. These were 
compared in a second step in order to identify pos-
sible intersecting signals, therefore defining potential 
intermediate biomarkers [28].
What is the signal that we have to pick up? In what 
sense will this give us the sought production-relation 
between exposure and disease? Our suggestion is to con-
ceptualize the detection and tracing of signals in terms 
of information transmission, as sketched above. This, we 
submit, is a generalization of Salmon’s mark transmission 
theory [27].
The key difference with Salmon processes consists in 
the marking aspect. Salmon’s approach rests on the intro-
duction of the mark. However, in most cancer research 
we look for existing marks from exposure to disease that 
transmit along the process, without introducing them 
ourselves. Cancer research is largely an observational 
rather than an experimental science.
This understanding of causal production as informa-
tion transmission takes full advantage of a conceptu-
alization in terms of mark transmission in processes, 
without being tied to the quantities of physics, say energy 
or momentum, being transmitted. It also takes full advan-
tage of a conceptualization in terms of mechanisms, 
because knowledge of relevant molecular or biochemi-
cal mechanisms will indicate where to look for signals, 
for instance choosing appropriate omics levels for the 
analyses of biological specimens. In this sense we say that 
mechanisms are information channels: “biochemical or 
molecular spaces” where we look for the flow of informa-
tion that we try to intercept using biomarkers [27].
Ultimately, we want to understand the whole phe-
nomenon of carcinogenesis: all the relevant omics levels 
involved, how they interact, and build reliable models 
of the dynamic evolution of whole systems under many 
different exposure conditions. The concept giving the 
dynamic evolution is information transmission. The flow 
is in the link, and the link, as suggested, is best thought 
of as informational. More precisely, it is given by the sci-
entists’ reconstruction of the information transmission 
through the different types of analyses, i.e. by putting 
together all the pieces of the “evidential puzzle”.
The question remains: what exactly does information 
mean? In Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS), 
there is at least some possibility of a clear (univocal) 
definition of information, as genes are more clearly 
defined than in most omic measurements, and substan-
tive informational concepts make sense when applied 
to genes. Instead, in Exposome Wide Association Stud-
ies (EWAS) information is still not well-defined [27]. 
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(Often omic “signals” are only “features”, i.e. they need to 
be decoded after discovery). However, the diversity and 
richness of informational concepts (many of which cur-
rently being developed and discussed), is not a weakness 
of an informational approach, but a virtue. This is cap-
tured, for instance, by philosophical accounts, especially 
those developing qualitative notions of information. 
One such account is semantic information, namely what 
the observer (here, the scientist) can process, looking at 
the data, omic analysis, biological theory, etc. It is in this 
sense that information transmission cannot be reduced 
to biological information, but it is certainly part of it.
One advantage of information transmission is that it 
is capable of offering a structure for thinking about how 
heterogeneous factors such as micro and macro-biolog-
ical and social—are linked; this is a pressing issue in the 
light of results of omic studies and also for the design of 
public health policies.
Conclusions
Systems biology is driven by technology (the develop-
ment of omics) and by statistical modelling and bioinfor-
matics. It is high time to bring biological thinking back. 
To address the new challenges of epidemiology, the con-
cept of the “exposome” has been proposed, initially by 
Wild et al. [14], and then expanded by others, particularly 
Rappaport and Smith [29] who functionalized the expo-
some in terms of chemical signals detectable in biospeci-
mens. This is consistent (and in fact is an extension) of 
previous work on molecular epidemiology by e.g. Schulte 
and Perera [1]. The canonical exposome concept refers to 
the totality of exposures from a variety of sources includ-
ing chemical agents, biological agents, radiation, and psy-
chosocial components from conception onward, over a 
complete lifetime [24]. We offered a unifying framework 
to incorporate omic data into causal models, using the 
position called “evidential pluralism”: causal reasoning 
is based on both “difference-making” and the underly-
ing biological mechanisms. In particular, we conceptu-
alize the way scientists detect and trace signals in terms 
of information transmission, which is a generalization 
of Salmon’s mark transmission theory. One advantage 
of information transmission is that it is capable of help-
ing us conceptualize how heterogeneous factors such as 
micro and macro-biological and psycho-social—are caus-
ally linked. What we want to make clear is that—though 
it is often thought that going down the molecular level 
means to add details to a macro-level causal relations—
this is in fact not the case. A good example in this respect 
is epigenetics, which shows that the way in which the 
macro is causally linked to the micro is not simply a mat-
ter of adding details to the same mechanism, but a mat-
ter of transmission of information from outside the body 
downstream to DNA and then the informational chain in 
the cell. This is important not only to understand cancer 
etiology, but also for the design of public health policies. 
In fact, public health interventions cannot target bio-
markers, but the right causal factors at the macro-level, 
such as environmental hazards and socio- economic and 
psychological factors.
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